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Despite large uncertainties in the fertilization efﬁciency, natural iron fertilization studies and some of
the purposeful iron enrichment studies have demonstrated that Southern Ocean iron fertilization can
lead to a signiﬁcant export of carbon from the sea surface to the ocean interior. From an economic
perspective the potential of ocean iron fertilization (OIF) is far from negligible in relation to other
abatement options. Comparing the range of cost estimates to the range of estimates for forestation
projects they are in the same order of magnitude, but OIF could provide more carbon credits even if high
discount rates are used to account for potential leakage and non-permanence. However, the uncertainty
about undesired adverse effects of purposeful iron fertilization on marine ecosystems and
biogeochemistry has led to attempts to ban commercial and, to some extent, scientiﬁc experiments
aimed at a better understanding of the processes involved, effectively precluding further consideration
of this mitigation option. As regards the perspective of public international law, the pertinent
agreements dealing with the protection of the marine environment indicate that OIF is to be considered
as lawful if and to the extent to which it represents legitimate scientiﬁc research. In this respect, the
precautionary principle can be used to balance the risks arising out of scientiﬁc OIF activities for
the marine environment with the potential advantages relevant to the objectives of the climate change
regime. As scientiﬁc OIF experiments involve only comparatively small negative impacts within a
limited marine area, further scientiﬁc research must be permitted to explore the carbon sequestration
potential of OIF in order to either reject this concept or integrate it into the ﬂexible mechanisms
contained in the Kyoto Protocol.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Today, most countries have accepted a 2 1C temperature
increase above preindustrial levels as maximum tolerable limit
for global warming. An exceedance probability of below 20% for
this limit implies an emission budget of less than 250GtC from
2000 until 2049, of which more than one third has already been
emitted by now. Extrapolating the current global CO2 emissions
this budget will only last until 2024 [1]. These numbers
emphasize that all options including geoengineering options need
to be considered to mitigate climate change [2]. Geoengineering
options include the enhancement of natural carbon sinks to
reduce atmospheric carbon concentration by removing past
emissions and, thereby, extending the remaining carbon emission
budget. The terrestrial carbon sink can be enhanced by means of
forestation; the oceanic sink can be enhanced by means of iron
fertilization. Doubts have been expressed about the potential ofll rights reserved.
x: +4943185853.
ickels).mitigating climate change by sink enhancement due to its
partially temporary characteristics [3,4]. Nevertheless, terrestrial
vegetation sinks have entered the Kyoto Protocol (2303 UNTS
148-KP) as offsets for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions,
but ocean sinks have not.
The potential of ocean iron fertilization (OIF) to enhance the
oceanic carbon sink is questioned in particular due to its
uncertain efﬁcacy and side effects. This has led some authors to
conclude that research and in particular large-scale experiments
on OIF should not be further pursued (e.g. [5]). This article
challenges this view and argues that further research about the
geoengineering potential of OIF is, indeed, necessary. Even
courageous climate polices may run the risk that catastrophic
climate change takes place, although expected to happen with a
low probability. If this risk increases, OIF may become one of the
options of last resort and needs to be explored in a timely manner
[6]. Therefore, it is important to analyze the potential of OIF on
the basis of a comprehensive approach, which brings together the
perspectives of science, economics, and law.
In general there are few studies considering OIF in the context
of an international climate agreement. To our knowledge, the rare
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the scientiﬁc, legal, and economic issues related to OIF, and the
requirements that carbon markets put on the generation of
carbon credits by OIF. While all three studies discuss OIF in
general, neither provides an explicit application of accounting
methods to OIF nor the inclusion of OIF carbon credits within a
global climate agreement. The perspective of public international
law has so far only been the subject of three studies by [10–12],
and has been examined in an opinion on the legality of the
LOHAFEX marine research experiment recently submitted by [13].
The article starts by brieﬂy reviewing the potential of OIF from
an oceanographic perspective, then proceeds and summarizes
ﬁndings of the analysis that investigates the economic potential of
OIF in the context of an international climate agreement [14–16].
Thereafter, the article examines what public international law
says today on the issue of OIF and what it should say in future.
The article concludes that OIF, if considered an option to mitigate
climate change, would have to be carried out under the auspices
of the international legal framework.2. Ocean iron fertilization: the oceanographic perspective
Beginning with the experimental work of [17], iron has been
recognized for more than two decades as important micronutrient
regulating marine productivity and associated biogeochemistry
over large ocean areas. This insight immediately led [18] to the
suggestion that adding iron compounds to the ocean might
present a practicable ‘‘technological ﬁx’’ to remove carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere. Meanwhile, a number of in situ OIF
experiments have conﬁrmed that phytoplankton growth is
limited by iron in the three major High Nutrient Low Chlorophyll
(HNLC) regions, i.e., the Southern Ocean [19], the eastern
equatorial Paciﬁc [20], and the subarctic North Paciﬁc [21]. All
experiments have revealed a signiﬁcant increase in phytoplank-
ton biomass and an associated decrease in the partial pressure of
CO2 (pCO2) in the surface water, with enhanced particle export
being observed at the end of one experiment [22]. However, the
experiments conducted so far did not primarily address carbon
sequestration, but instead were aimed at a more genuine
scientiﬁc understanding of the role of iron in marine ecology
and biogeochemistry. Such an understanding is required, e.g., to
better assess impacts of past and likely future changes in iron
supply by dust or icebergs. Time and space scales of the
experiments carried out so far have precluded a clear assessment
of the export and fate of the extra carbon ﬁxed as a result of the
fertilization.
Clear observational evidence for an iron-induced enhancement
of carbon export has been obtained from programs targeting
natural OIF at the Kerguelen plateau and Crozet Islands in the
Southern Ocean. At both sites, seasonal export ﬂuxes were found
to be more than three times higher than in adjacent non-fertilized
regions [23,24]. Both estimates differ, however, in the inferred
ratio of carbon export to iron supply by an order of magnitude.
The reason for this difference is not yet understood and requires
further study [24].
To what extent the enhanced export of particulate carbon
leads to a net drawdown of atmospheric CO2 depends on the
fertilization region. Model studies suggest that the carbon
sequestration potential of OIF is essentially limited to the
Southern Ocean, with very limited impact in the HNLC regions
of the equatorial or subpolar North Paciﬁc [25–27]. Information
on the magnitude of CO2 sequestration potential of large-scale OIF
comes from a combination of numerical ocean models and paleo
records: Continental Antarctic ice core data of dust and of
atmospheric CO2 across glacial–interglacial cycles [28] andcompilations of Southern Ocean sea-ﬂoor sediment records [29]
suggest that enhanced glacial atmospheric iron supply led to a
carbon sequestration of about 100GtC. A caveat is that this
atmospheric CO2 drawdown took several thousand years. On the
other hand, it is not known to what extent the glacial dust supply
was sufﬁcient to fully relieve Southern Ocean iron limitation.
Estimates of the sequestration potential of large-scale iron
fertilization on centennial time scales, so far, essentially rely on
numerical modeling studies. These have suggested that large-
scale Southern Ocean iron fertilization may sequester some
70–180GtC within hundred years (e.g. [25,27]). Even the lower
end of the large range is far from negligible and amounts to about
one ‘‘stabilization wedge’’ as introduced by [30].
Besides observational and theoretical evidence for a
non-negligible carbon sequestration potential, there is also
evidence for signiﬁcant perturbations of marine biogeochemistry
and ecology by large-scale OIF. In fact, some alteration in the
function of pelagic ecosystems is the very objective of carbon
sequestration by OIF. Any assessment of OIF therefore has to
account for both intended and unintended consequences [31].
Unintended consequences identiﬁed so far include a downstream
reduction of nutrients and productivity [26], expansion of anoxic
areas [25], increased production of the greenhouse gas nitrous
oxide [32], and changes in species composition [33]. Interestingly,
a model study of Southern Ocean OIF shows that volumes of low-
oxygen waters and associated production of N2O may eventually
decrease in response to downstream reduction in nutrients
fueling production above the tropical oxygen minimum zones
[14]. Further study is needed to obtain a robust assessment of the
currently known potential consequences and to evaluate these
against the potential consequences of leaving the CO2 in the
atmosphere. While we acknowledge that Garrett Hardin’s ﬁrst
law of ecology, ‘‘we can never do merely one thing’’ [34], does
apply to iron fertilization, we have to bear in mind that it applies
equally well to emitting CO2 into the atmosphere.3. Ocean iron fertilization: the economic perspective
To explore the economic potential of OIF in the context of an
international treaty on climate change requires ﬁrst answers to
the following questions: How many carbon credits are generated,
how are they assigned, and can they be used for compliance.
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) established such criteria for Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)
projects. The projects have to be measured by an approved
methodology, the storage has to be additional, the credits have to
be veriﬁed by a third party, the storage has to be permanent, and
the number of carbon credits has to take into account leakage
[35]. Leinen [8] discusses the fulﬁllment of these criteria for
carbon sink enhancement through OIF. Following her line of
reasoning, the criteria regarding methodology and additionality
are easily fulﬁlled by OIF. The criterion of veriﬁcation by a third
party does apply in particular to projects between single ﬁrms or
single countries in the context of CDM and JI. We consider
large-scale OIF, realized within an international project as an
element of an international post-Kyoto climate regime. Without
international coordination the use of OIF would be inefﬁciently
low. Also, it would be more difﬁcult to establish mechanisms that
address adverse side effects in an adequate way [6]. The
remaining two criteria are the requirement of taking into account
the issue of permanence and leakage. The degree of fulﬁllment of
both criteria determines the number of carbon credits assigned to
the sink enhancement project.
Addressing the issue of permanence ﬁrst, for terrestrial
sinks various carbon accounting methodologies have been
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projects (e.g. [36–40]). A common assumption within these
approaches is to assess permanence over the time period of
100 years, following the IPCC’s deﬁnition of permanence for
sequestration projects [41].1 Four carbon accounting methods
exist that assign permanent carbon credits: the net method, the
average storage method, the discount method, and the equiva-
lence method (permanent methods). The net method, for
example, measures the overall effect of OIF for a given period of
time, generally 100 years no matter when the carbon ﬂuxes take
place within that period. Two carbon accounting methods exist
that assign temporary carbon credits: the shorttemp method and
the longtemp method (temporary methods). Another method
exists that assigns permanent and as well temporary carbon
credits:
the mixed method. Temporary carbon credits used for compliance
have to be replaced at some point in time, permanent carbon
credits not. Under the KP two of the above assignment options are
applied, the permanent and the temporary method. Terrestrial
sink enhancement projects can generate temporary carbon credits
only. Papers discussing the effectiveness of OIF implicitly apply
the net method.
Rickels et al. [15] discuss all these accounting methods and
apply them to OIF. The results indicate that overall, and from an
economic perspective, the short-term method is most appropriate
for temporary OIF. Based on this method the largest amount of
carbon credits is provided at an early state. Also, the fraction that
is permanently provided until the end of the crediting period is
larger compared to the other methods. The equivalence method,
for example, is less attractive due to the equivalence factor, which
leads to a spread of credits over a much longer time horizon than
other methods. These methods are also referred to as ton-year
accounting schemes. From an environmental perspective, the
shorttemp method seems most appropriate as well as the effect of
OIF is at least neutral. No additional carbon emissions will be
released, because all credits have to be replaced at some point in
time. As a substantial fraction of carbon is stored permanently,
the method leads to net carbon reductions.
Addressing the issue of leakage, all potential offsets have to be
taken into account to obtain the net amount of carbon credits.
Potential offsets arise due to carbon emission outside the
enhancement region and due to changes in emissions of other
greenhouse gases than carbon. In the context of OIF additional
emissions of N2O are particularly important and need to be
considered [14]. A third potential offset that has to be considered
when relating sink enhancement and carbon storage projects to
changes in atmospheric CO2 is the source of the stored carbon.
Storage projects that change the path of future atmospheric
CO2 concentrations also change the ﬂuxes between the atmo-
sphere and the terrestrial and oceanic reservoirs as these respond
to changed atmospheric pCO2. In consequence, carbon is not
only removed from the atmosphere but as well from other
sinks [14].
To account for leakage the analysis by Rickels et al. [15] uses
global data on oceanic carbon uptake instead of local data and
introduces discount factors. The discount factor deducts the gross
amount of carbon credits to a net amount, which then can be used
for compliance. To offset N2O emissions the average discount
factor ranges between 5.6% and 10.1% for the various accounting
methods analyzed. However, the upper and lower bounds for
discount factors vary between the various accounting methods
and the various experiments, ranging overall from 0.23% to1 The choice of 100 years is not based on scientiﬁc rationale but was rather
policy driven [8].13.26%. These ranges indicate that the potential of OIF cannot be
determined with great accuracy. However, within an interna-
tional treaty, like the KP, a discount rate could be chosen that is
signiﬁcantly large to compensate for this lack of knowledge
and to take into account uncertainties. Considering offsets by
other greenhouse gases as well as carbon emissions from ship
operations, Rickels et al. [15] suggest an upper bound of 15%
for the discount factor. Applying this discount factor to the
net method, they ﬁnd a range of 0.4 to 2.2GtC for annual oceanic
carbon uptake for OIF in the Southern Ocean, if OIF is
implemented for 10 years. Increasing the duration of implemen-
tation to 100 years, the range narrows to 0.5–1.4GtC. In the model
of Oschlies et al. [14], about 90% of the carbon sequestered in the
ocean as result of OIF originates from the atmosphere (and the
rest from the terrestrial vegetation). This percentage is higher
than the airborne fraction of anthropogenic CO2 emissions which,
for the period 2010–2110, amounts to about 60% in the model
[14,15].
In comparison to OIF, enhancing terrestrial carbon sinks by
forestry activities has entered the KP as offsets for anthropogenic
carbon emissions but the potential is uncertain as well. In a recent
study, the annual potential of global forestry activities, including
reforestation, forest management, expanded use of forest
products, and reduced deforestation, for carbon uptake is
estimated between 0.4 and 0.8GtC until 2030 assuming carbon
prices between 20 and 100 USD per ton CO2 [42,43]. The share of
reforestation is approximately one-third [42]. Extending the time
horizon to 2100, the range for reforestation enlarges and amounts
to an annual carbon uptake of 0.2–1.1GtC [44–46]. These
numbers indicate that the potential of forestation cannot be
determined with that great accuracy as well. van Kooten and
Sohngen [47] show that there is a great inconsistency across
forestry activity studies in how carbon uptake and costs are
measured, so that costs of creating carbon credits through forestry
activities vary widely. They conclude that the widely held notion
that these activities are a low-cost means for reducing atmo-
spheric CO2 [48] needs to be reassessed.
As discussed above, another relevant issue for determining the
effectiveness of a project is leakage, which is often ignored in
bottom-up forestry activities analysis [47]. Forest management
regimes such as drainage might lead to higher emissions of other
greenhouse gases, in particular CH4 and N2O [49]. Estimates for
forestry projects vary widely between 5% and 93% [50]. Leakage
also arises, if the stored carbon in forest is intendedly or
unintendedly released. In particular the unintended release due
to naturally occurring events like ﬁres, pest, droughts or
hurricanes imposes a risk on long-term storage prospects [51].
The likelihood of such naturally occurring risks may increase in
the future due to global warming and would make terrestrial
carbon sinks less attractive [49].
Using recent sequestration efﬁciency ratios from patch OIF
experiments, Boyd [52] estimates that the costs are between
8 and 80 USD per ton CO2 sequestered. For large-scale OIF no cost
estimates exist. However, OIF will not be used if costs exceed the
beneﬁts as a mitigation option. Regarding the still existing
uncertainty regarding volume of and costs for OIF, Rickels et al.
[16] turn the question around and seek to determine the critical
cost levels and the critical amounts for carbon credits from
OIF that indicate if OIF would be competitive to forestry or CDM
activities. Applying short-term OIF model experiments for the
duration of 1, 7, and 10 years they obtain critical unit cost for
the upper level between 95 and 119 USD per ton CO2 and between
22 and 23 USD per ton CO2 for the lower level. The upper level of
the estimates indicates if OIF could be considered an abatement
option at all compared to the current status of climate policy
including existing abatement option. For the lower level it is
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credits generated in low-cost countries is completely relaxed.
The lower level of the estimates, therefore indicates, if OIF would
be comparable to options which achieve a given emission
reduction target at lowest costs. OIF should at least generate the
same efﬁciency gains as extending existing options, like unlimited
trade with CDM and HotAir countries and unlimited carbon
credits from forestation.
Comparing this range of cost estimates to those of [52] for
patch OIF experiments indicates that the upper and lower levels
of those estimates are below the corresponding range of the upper
and lower levels of the estimates of [16]. However, it must be
noted that these cost estimates might not be representative for
large-scale OIF [9]. Comparing the range of cost estimates to the
range of estimates for forestation projects, they are in the same
order of magnitude. However, OIF may well provide more carbon
credits. Rickels et al. [16] show that 7 years of large-scale OIF
in the area of 301 South can provide the same amount of credits
equivalent to a global forestation project for the duration of
20 years.
Therefore, current knowledge regarding the potential as well
as the costs does not allow excluding OIF as possible an
abatement option in the future.4. Ocean iron fertilization: the public international law
perspective
The preceding economic analysis has shown that the comparison
to efﬁciency criteria established by existing abatement options and
in particular by existing sink enhancement options does not allow
for an exclusion of OIF as possible abatement option. Consequently,
the inclusion of OIF activities in future global or regional emission
trading schemes could result in considerable economic beneﬁts. This
conclusion renders calls for prohibiting or restricting any such
activity under public international law in need of justiﬁcation. While
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (ILM 31
[1992], 874) states that ‘‘[i]n order to achieve sustainable develop-
ment, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of
the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from
it’’, it is implicitly acknowledged in the very same Principle
4 of the Declaration that economic development, indeed, constitutes
one of the three central pillars (the other two being environmental
protection and intergenerational justice) on which the concept of
sustainable development is founded. Thus, economic aspects should
at least be taken into account (even though not necessarily given
priority) whenever a certain activity is assessed by the competent
fora in respect of whether it should be accepted or not.
Notwithstanding the fact that the concept of sustainable
development is, by itself, not a binding principle of international
law but a political key concept that aims at providing a framework
for decision making processes both on the national and interna-
tional plane (see, e.g. [53]), the need to consider the economic
impacts of OIF arises from the scientiﬁc uncertainty connected
with its potentially negative effects on the marine environment,
the novel character of the underlying legal questions as well as
the epochal challenge posed by global warming. However, as will
be shown in the following, current developments in international
relations seem to point at the opposite direction, i.e., the
imposition of a complete moratorium on OIF. Discussions recently
held within one of the competent international bodies on a
catalogue of numerous and strict criteria, which should be
fulﬁlled prior to the commencement of scientiﬁc OIF experiments
suggest that the concern voiced here might, ultimately, also apply
to fundamental scientiﬁc research. If lack of a scientiﬁc basis on
which to justify a certain potentially harmful activity is used tostrengthen the case against scientiﬁc research on the very same
subject matter, though, it is difﬁcult to argue that such a course of
conduct is sustainable. From a legal perspective, it is submitted
that these developments are not based on an adequate reading of
the precautionary principle. It will be argued here that such a
reading does not address the issue of potential negative impacts
on the marine environment in an isolated manner, but is rather
based on the understanding that these impacts must, again, be
weighed in light of the global challenges deriving from climate
change.
4.1. Relevant international agreements
If one, in a ﬁrst step, examines the rules of public international
law applicable to OIF, it is generally accepted that whenever a
question affecting the oceans is to be answered, the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1833 UNTS 3–UNCLOS)
should be referred to ﬁrst. This framework treaty, a ‘‘constitution of
the seas’’, was concluded according to its preamble with the
objective ‘‘to promote [y] the study, protection and preservation
of the marine environment’’, as speciﬁed by part XII of the
Convention. In consideration that OIF conducted in certain marine
areas could constitute ‘‘dumping’’, Art. 210 UNCLOS is the initially
relevant protectionary norm. Its paragraph 1 requires the contract-
ing parties ‘‘[to] adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment by dumping’’. The
reference to ‘‘global rules and standards’’ contained in this norm is
generally understood as a reference to the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter of 1972 (London Convention—LC) and the Protocol to the
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter of 1996 (London Protocol—LP), which
replaces the LC for its contracting parties, which are speciﬁcally
applicable to pollution by dumping [10].
The concept of ‘‘dumping’’ is deﬁned in Art. III (1)(a) LC and
Art. 1 No. 4.1.1 LP (as well as in Art. 1 (5)(a) UNCLOS) as follows:
(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter
from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures
at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms
or other man-made structures at sea.
Even if iron ﬁlings introduced into the marine environment
were not classiﬁed as ‘‘wastes’’, they would still be classiﬁed as
‘‘other matter’’. Since they will remain in the ocean, ‘‘disposal’’
appears to be occurring [11,12]. However, this alone does not lead
to the conclusion that OIF constitutes ‘‘dumping’’. Art. III (1)(b)(ii)
LC and Art. 1 (4) No. 2.2 LP (as well as Art. 1 (5)(b)(ii)) UNCLOS)
contain an exception, under which
‘‘Dumping’ does not include: [y] (ii) placement of matter for a
purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided
that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this
Convention.’’
Accordingly, the placement of iron ﬁlings for purposes other
than mere disposal should not be seen as dumping, provided it is
not contrary to the objectives of the LC and the LP. Since the
goal of OIF is the stimulation of the primary production of
phytoplankton in order to scientiﬁcally examine this process and
its consequences with a view to potential increases in the uptake
of CO2, an objective other than the mere disposal of iron ﬁlings is
being pursued.
The question remains whether OIF activities are contrary to
the aims of the LC and the LP. The purpose of these treaties is to
prevent the pollution of the oceans through the dumping of
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objectives of the Conventions would seem to exist when the
substances introduced have a potentially damaging effect on
human health, living resources and/or marine life (see Art. I LC;
Art. 2 in connection with Art. 1.6.10 LP). As shown above, it is
currently not possible to rule out negative consequences of OIF for
marine life or for human beings [54–56]. Having said that, it
should not be ignored that the main purpose of OIF experiments is
not, at least not foremost, the mere stimulation of primary
production in the ocean, but, instead, to investigate a potential
stimulation of phytoplankton blooms under speciﬁc conditions
and their consequences, as well as to achieve a more general
understanding of the role of iron in marine ecology and
biogeochemistry. This conclusion strongly militates in favor of
accepting that not all scientiﬁc OIF experiments are contrary to
the aims of the LC and the LP.
In this respect, one must note that the issue relevant
here is also addressed by other international treaties, which
potentially overlap with the aforementioned law of the sea
instruments. In particular, reference to the primary agreement
relevant to climate change, the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (1771 UNTS 107—UNFCCC) and
its 1997 KP, is mandatory. The ultimate aim of the UNFCCC is to
achieve a stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system (Art. 2 UNFCCC),
but it contains only comparatively weak obligations of mainly
procedural nature such as, e.g., the duty to gather and share
information on greenhouse gas emissions, national policies, and
best practices. In contrast, the KP obliges the industrialized
States (Annex I States) to ensure that their greenhouse gas
emissions do not exceed their individually assigned limitation
and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B. It is
generally recognized that the ocean is a natural CO2 sink in
terms of the KP. Against this background, one might well ask
whether an isolated interpretation of the aims of the LC and LP
might, ultimately, not result in a contradiction with the
objectives of the climate change regime.
Having said that, the KP calls on its parties to implement
policies and measures ‘‘taking into account its commitments
under relevant international environmental agreements’’
(Art. 2 (1) lit. a (ii) KP). One of the key international instruments
in this respect is the Convention on Biological Diversity (1760
UNTS 79—CBD). The Convention addresses the protection and
sustainable use of biological diversity with regard to habitats,
species, and genetic resources ‘‘from all sources including, inter
alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and
the ecological complexes of which they are a part’’ (Art. 2).
Since the protection standards contained therein not only apply
to the marine biodiversity of areas within the limits of national
jurisdiction, but also to processes and activities carried
out under the jurisdiction or control of the States parties within
the area of their national jurisdiction as well as beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction (Art. 4), the CBD has a role to play in light
of the potentially negative impacts of OIF on marine ecosystems.
On the other hand, Art. 22 (2) CBD, which serves as a derogation
norm in the relationship between the CBD and other multilateral
treaties, expressly recognizes that the CBD, in regard to the
protection of the marine environment, must be interpreted in
agreement with the rights and obligations of States in
accordance with the international law of the sea. Against this
background, it cannot be unambiguously concluded from
the texts of the pertinent conventions whether all OIF activities,
including scientiﬁc experiments, are contrary to the objective
of safeguarding the general duty to protect the marine
environment.4.2. Current developments
This state of unclarity has recently led several of the
competent international fora to address the issue relevant here.
As regards the legality of OIF activities under the CBD, the 9th
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention adopted
Decision IX/16 on ‘‘Biodiversity and Climate Change’’ in May
2008, whose relevant part reads:
‘‘4. Bearing in mind the ongoing scientiﬁc and legal analysis
occurring under the auspices of the London Convention (1972)
and the 1996 London Protocol, requests Parties and urges other
Governments, in accordance with the precautionary approach,
to ensure that ocean fertilization activities do not take place
until there is an adequate scientiﬁc basis on which to justify
such activities [y]; with the exception of small scale scientiﬁc
research studies within coastal waters.’’
Since small-scale scientiﬁc research studies within coastal
waters are not suitable for such experiments [55–57], Decision IX/
16 amounts, in substance, to a moratorium on OIF activities,
including scientiﬁc experiments.
About half a year before, the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to
the LC and the LP released a Statement of Concern regarding OIF.
In this document, it was stated that
recognizing that it was within the purview of each State to
consider proposals on a case-by-case basis in accordance with
the London Convention and Protocol, urged States to use the
utmost caution when considering proposals for large-scale
ocean fertilization operations. The governing bodies took
the view that, given the present state of knowledge regarding
ocean fertilization, such large-scale operations were currently
not justiﬁed.
One year later, in November 2008 (i.e., after the adoption of
CBD Decision IX/16), the same body adopted Resolution LC-LP.1
(2008) on the regulation of OIF. According to paragraph 8 of this
document, OIF activities are contrary to the objectives of the
London regime if and to the extent to which they cannot be
qualiﬁed as legitimate scientiﬁc research:
AGREE that, given the present state of knowledge, ocean
fertilization activities other than legitimate scientiﬁc research
should not be allowed. To this end, such other activities should
be considered as contrary to the aims of the Convention and
Protocol and not currently qualify for any exemption from the
deﬁnition of dumping in Article III.1(b) of the Convention and
Article 1.4.2 of the Protocol.
It was pointed out by Proelss [13] that neither the CBD
Decision nor the Statement of Concern and the resolution LC-LP.1
are by themselves legally binding. However, since Resolution
LC-LP.1 (2008) directly examines the question whether OIF should
be categorized as dumping under the LC and LP, it can be referred
to as an aid in the interpretation of the scope of the respective
Conventions. The conclusion is that legitimate OIF experiments
cannot be considered as prohibited dumping.
As expressly demanded by Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008), the
Scientiﬁc Group of the LC and LP is currently working to establish
an assessment framework for scientiﬁc research involving OIF.
The framework, which has so far been agreed upon contains a
detailed catalogue (approximately 20 pages) of strict criteria to be
fulﬁlled for evaluating whether an OIF experiment constitutes
legitimate scientiﬁc research in terms of the Resolution. As an
initial assessment as well as a detailed risk analysis will be
required, effectively realizing an OIF experiment is likely to pose a
serious, if not unrealizable, challenge for scientists. Indeed, the
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the decision that legitimate scientiﬁc research shall be considered
as being lawful. Additionally, in light of the economic beneﬁts
described above, it is at least doubtful whether any such
implementation of Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008) can be held to be
sustainable.
4.3. Impact of the precautionary principle
It is submitted that further clariﬁcation can be achieved by
reference to the precautionary principle. This principle constitutes
the common denominator of virtually all of the pertinent legal
instruments including the LC and LP, and may, arguably, be
used as a balancing tool to measure the environmental beneﬁts
arising out of a certain activity against its potentially negative
impacts on another part of the environment [58]. Additionally, it
is commonly held to be one of the cornerstones of the concept of
sustainable development (see only [59]). While it is true
that assessment frameworks constitute one of the means of
implementation of the precautionary principle, one might ask
whether the catalogue of criteria discussed within the context of
the LC and LP is consistent with its requirements.
Notwithstanding a considerable degree of unclarity as to its
normative content and validity [60–63], it is well established that
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration contains the most widely
known formulation of the precautionary principle:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by all States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradations.
By explicitly referring to cost-effective measures, the precau-
tionary principle requires a careful analysis of the economic
impacts of a decision [64]. It does not provide an authorization to
act, but shall be considered whenever States exercise their rights
and obligations under public international law.
If one attempts to explore the relevance of the precautionary
principle in the context at hand, recourse to the differentiation
between rules and principles appears to be helpful. Dealing with
Hart’s concept of positivistic legal theory, Dworkin developed his
famous principle paradigm [65]. According to Hart’s concept of
law, legal systems are composed solely by rules [66]. If a
certain situation cannot be judged on the basis of existing rules,
the judge has to take a discretionary decision by referring to
extra-judicial, often moralistic criteria. This is the point of
criticism for Dworkin, who argues that even in such a situation
there must be a legally binding standard to be applied by the
judge. For Dworkin, this standard becomes manifest in legal
principles [65]. Principles are characterized as ‘‘optimizing
commands’’ [67]. They express certain values, but do not require
a speciﬁc behavior of the respective subject of law. Principles can
be realized to varying degrees subject to the legal possibilities, i.e.,
the extent to which a certain principle can be implemented
depends on the existence and scope of competing principles.
Thus, the application of legal principles generally results in a fair
balance of values. By contrast, rules are structured in the pattern
of fact and legal consequence and are applicable in an ‘‘all-or-
nothing-fashion’’ [65]. They are speciﬁc in their requirements
and consequences. If a rule is valid, it prescribes a deﬁnitive
legal consequence by permitting, forbidding or commanding
something. If it is not valid, it has no inﬂuence on the decision.
As regards the precautionary principle, its elements are
characterized by a degree of indetermination, which precludesan implementation of that principle in an ‘‘all-or-nothing-
fashion’’. It constitutes a ‘‘norm of aspiration’’ rather than a
‘‘norm of obligation’’ [68]. This becomes particularly manifest in
the element ‘‘lack of full scientiﬁc certainty’’ contained in
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. It is exactly this vagueness,
which shows that the precautionary principle must be qualiﬁed as
a legal principle [62].
If one applies this classiﬁcation to the case of OIF, one must
note that on the basis of an isolated reading of the relevant
provisions of the law of the sea (see Art. 1 (1) No. 4, Art. 194
(1) UNCLOS), the precautionary principle seems to militate in
favor of the protection of the marine environment. On the other
hand, Art. 3 (3) UNFCCC demands that the lack of full scientiﬁc
certainty of mitigation measures should not be used as a reason
for postponing such measures where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage. Consequently, within the context of
global warming the precautionary principle argues for permit-
ting OIF activities. Against this background, and keeping in mind
the nature of the precautionary principle as a principle of law,
the precautionary principle ought to be used to balance the risks
arising out of scientiﬁc OIF activities (which are likely to
contradict with the aims contained in the CBD) with the
potential advantages relevant to the objectives of the UNFCCC
and the KP.
If one measures the potential negative impacts of OIF on the
marine environment against the global dangers resulting from
rising CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, it is submitted that a
proper application of the precautionary principle can only lead to
the conclusion that further scientiﬁc research must be permitted
to explore the sequestration potential of OIF in order to either
reject this concept or integrate it into the ﬂexible mechanisms
contained in the KP. This is even more so with a view to the
potential economic beneﬁts of OIF examined in this paper.
A fortiori, fundamental research on the role of iron in marine
ecology and biogeochemistry is to be permitted. In contrast
to large-scale and periodic commercial OIF, scientiﬁc OIF
experiments involve, as far as is known today, only small negative
impacts within a very limited marine area. Based on this
reasoning, it seems impossible to justify a complete moratorium
on OIF including scientiﬁc experiments. Having said that, whether
or not commercial activities should be permitted by inclusion
of OIF in the ﬂexible Kyoto mechanisms depends on the outcome
of experiments dealing with the potential negative impacts of OIF
on the marine environment.5. Conclusion
This article has challenged the view that research on OIF
should not be further pursued. Neither the scientiﬁc nor the
economic analysis has resulted in the identiﬁcation of an
exclusion criterion suggesting that OIF should not be considered
as a geoengineering option. Consistently, it has been demon-
strated that public international law does not require the
imposition of a complete moratorium on OIF. On the contrary,
as far as scientiﬁc research experiments are concerned, a proper
analysis of the pertinent agreements as well as an adequate
reading of the precautionary principle results in a clear presump-
tion in favour of permitting such activities.
Against the background of an ever declining carbon emission
budget on the one hand and widespread reluctance to accept
meaningful global reduction targets on the other, including OIF
into a post-Kyoto climate agreement might provide new incen-
tives for the negotiation process. Rickels et al. [16] show that
countries with high abatement costs are expected to be more or
less indifferent between the option of extending the share of
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including OIF, presuming that only countries with positive
reduction targets are included in the allocation of OIF carbon
credits. CDM countries like China are expected to favor the ﬁrst
option. Consequently, a third option could be considered, which
realizes both options, extending the share of CDM carbon credits
and including OIF, but which allocates OIF carbon credits to CDM
countries, if these would accept emission reduction targets in a
future commitment period.
However, only discussing OIF as a potential geoengineering
option tends to provoke public resistance, which in the case of the
German–Indian LOHAFEX experiment resulted in anti-scientists
propaganda by individual non-governmental organizations,
political struggle between different German government autho-
rities and calls for implementing a complete ban on commercial
and, to some extent, scientiﬁc experiments. These views and
attempts, based on statements about uncertain side effects and
consequences, reveal an attitude that emphasizes continuity
above alteration.
All of the unintended side effects are generally considered as
‘‘adverse’’ effects. This valuation seems to be based on the
conservational view that changing the ocean is generally ‘‘bad’’.
This is in contrast to many terrestrial environments where
enhanced food production, forestation or other management
activities are often viewed as permissible if not desirable. From
a governance point of view, however, ocean resources generally
and OIF speciﬁcally are not intrinsically different from terrestrial
or avian resources and environmental uses [69]. What leads us
to treat the oceanic and terrestrial environment differently
essentially is a cultural question.
Disregarding our cultural reservation against non-ﬁshery
related ocean change, a valuation might be more complicated.
For example, how do we value the likeliness of enhanced marine
production in the Southern Ocean that may turn out beneﬁcial for
many species including the hunted-down whale populations
[70]? How do we account for the situation that large-scale
Southern Ocean OIF might, via downstream reduction of macro-
nutrients, lead to reduced oxygen minimum zones and associated
nitrous oxide emissions in the tropical oceans [14]?
We have to acknowledge that we will never have full
knowledge or forethought of all the risks, which are associated
with OIF—nor of the risks associated with discarding OIF under
continuing CO2 emissions. Given the multi-sectoral and
overwhelmingly serious challenges posed by climate change, a
truly global phenomenon, as well as the difﬁculties in achieving
wordwide agreement on a sufﬁcient degree of emissions
reductions, there is, indeed, no alternative to further explore
engineering options such as large-scale OIF.Acknowledgement
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